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ABSTRACT 
 
The positive relationship between access to credit and household welfare has been well 
explored and documented in the literature. The literature however sees just few research 
papers about Vietnam. One issue with most research papers in this area however is that 
while the conclusions are consistent, they mostly draw their findings from the analysis of 
cross-section data obtained from household surveys. Such an analysis represents a 
snapshot view and does not tell us much about the long-term impact of access to credit on 
household welfare. In this paper, we develop an econometric framework to test the 
impact of access to credit on household welfare in the long-run using data from two 
household surveys in Vietnam. The first survey covers a sample of 4,799 households, 150 
communes and 300 villages over the country. The second survey, taken after 5 years, 
covers a sample of 5,999 households, 194 communes and 388 villages, including all 
households surveyed in the first survey. Our econometric framework considers and 
controls for the effect of endogenous credit and of the sample selection bias. We employ 
a three stage regression: the first stage controls for the sample selection bias; the second 
stage controls for the endogeneity of credit; and the third stage is to estimate the impact 
of access to credit on household welfare, where the inverse Mill’s ratios and the predicted 
residuals, which are computed from the first and second stages, are included as 
explanatory variables. We find that access to credit has a positive and significant long-
term impact on household welfare in terms of per capita expenditure, per capita food 
expenditure and per capita non-food expenditure. We also find that although both formal 
and informal credit contribute to household welfare, formal credit has a relatively higher 
impact than its informal counterpart. Our findings imply some policy recommendations. 
On the one hand, the findings encourage policies that improve the access to credit for 
poor households in rural areas. On the other hand, the low level of impact suggests that 
the subsidized credit should be reconsidered.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between access to finance and household poverty reduction has been 
well explored in the literature.  Evidence on the positive impact could be seen from 
pioneer research studies such as Khandker (1998, 2001, 2003), Pitt and Khandker (1998), 
Coleman (2002) etc or from more recent studies such as Karlan and Zinman (2010), 
Augsburg et al (2014), Angelucci et al (2015), Banerjee et al (2015) .etc.  
The literature sees just few research papers about Vietnam. Among the few, 
Lensink and Pham (2012) find positive impact of access to credit and of the accumulated 
amount of credit on self-employment profits in Vietnam. Doan et al (2014) suggest that 
access to formal credit leads to positive impact on household’s spending on education 
and healthcare while the informal credit does not. Or recently, Tran et al (2015) find that 
access to credit helps increase household income by 30% for the poor household as 
compared to the average household income, and that the formal credit plays more 
important role in this impact. Nghiem et al (2012), using a quasi-experimental study on 
households of microfinance programs by NGOs, however find that there is no significant 
impact of participation on household welfare proxied by income and consumption per 
adult equivalent. Other papers focus on the demand for credit or credit rationing, such as 
Pham and Izumida (2002) and on the use of credit such as Barsland and Tarp (2008) who 
find that formal credit is used mostly for production and asset accumulation while formal 
credit is for consumption smoothing. 
While the conclusions are consistent, almost all of the above-mentioned papers 
draw their findings from analysis of cross-section data obtained from household surveys. 
Such an analysis represents a snapshot view and does not tell us much about the long-
term impact of credit on household welfare. It is possible that, if we consider a borrowing 
household at a specific time t only, this household may generate higher economic welfare 
because at time t the economic condition is better, rather than because that credit has 
improved its welfare. In general, it may well be the case that the single-period impact of 
credit on household welfare is temporary, rather than persistent, or spurious. 
This paper develops an econometric framework to investigate the long-term 
impact of credit on household welfare in Vietnam, using panel data. We seek to establish 
whether (or not) the changes in household welfare are correlated with changes in 
household borrowing in the long term. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we develop an 
econometric framework for panel data analysis. Data characteristics and construction of 
variables are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
considers their implications. The concluding remarks summarise the key findings of the 
paper. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The baseline model 
 
We motivate our model by considering a household i in village j who borrows at both 
times, t and t+1. At a certain time t, denote cijt as the accumulative amount of credit that 
this household has borrowed by time t and yijt as an economic welfare that the household 
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obtains at time t.  The reduced form of the household borrowing and household welfare 
function are as follows:  
c
ijt
c
wcij
c
ijt
c
ijt
c
ijt
c
ijt wxxxc  
'
3
'
32
'
21
'
10     
 (1) 
y
ijtwijcijtijtijtijt wxxxy  
''
32
'
21
'
10    
 (2) 
where x1 is a vector of household characteristics; x2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; and x3 is a vector of lender characteristics; w is a vector of unobservable 
characteristics of the household and local markets that may affect cijt and yijt.. cijt and ijt 
are mean-zero stochastic errors. The parameters of interest are ci (i = 0,1,2,3) and i 
(i=0,1,2,c). 
The household characteristics include the natural attributes such as the age of the 
household head, the gender of the household head and the household endowment such as 
the education of the household head, the ownership of land and household savings. The 
local market characteristics include the proxy variables representing the local economy 
such as the prices of the selected goods and services or the competitive advantage of the 
local market such as the average ownership of land, the average education of household 
head. The lender characteristics include the type of lenders: formal and informal and the 
availability of formal and informal funds. 
 
Endogenous credit 
 
With cross-section data, the endogeneity of credit arises for a number of reasons (see, for 
examples, Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Khandker and Faruque, 2002).  First, the non-
random allocation of credit may lead to biased estimation of the impact of credit on 
household welfare. The lender may screen applicants based on their characteristics. It is 
likely that the credit is distributed to better-off households, but better-off households 
generally are considered to be able to generate higher welfare. Also, the lenders may 
allocate more credit to some targeted markets, for example to poorer villages (e.g. lenders 
offer loans in compliance with a poverty reduction strategy or a regional development 
policy). It may be that borrowing households in poorer villages generate lower welfare 
than the non-borrowing households in better-off villages. Hence, the comparison of the 
credit impact on borrowing and non-borrowing households may be misleading. This type 
of bias was widely documented in the econometric literature, such as Heckman (1974, 
1979), but in the literature of access to credit it was initiated with Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) and Coleman (1999). 
In addition, the unobservable characteristics of households and local markets 
affect both the household borrowing, cijt, and the household welfare, yijt. In other words, 
the error terms, cijk and ijk, are likely to be correlated. These unobservable characteristics 
may include preference heterogeneity, dedication and special effort exerted by 
households, or the competitive advantages of the local markets. It is possible that a 
household with greater preference, dedication or effort is more willing to borrow than 
others, and then is more capable to generate higher welfare than others. Thus, we may see 
that the generated economic welfare might not result from the increased borrowing, but 
from the fact that some households are more dedicated or hard-working than others. The 
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estimation of the impact of credit on household welfare is therefore inconsistent (see Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998). 
With panel data, households are observed at some points in time, e.g. at t and 
t+1. As a result, the problem of endogeneity of credit is reduced to some extent 
(Khandker , 2003). If we consider the welfare function (2) at two points in time and take 
the difference, the unobserved characteristics are likely to be eliminated. The underlying 
assumption for this argument to be true and also for the estimation to be consistent is that 
the unobservable characteristics hardly change from t to t+1. More specifically, it is 
expected that the preference heterogeneity, dedication and effort exerted by a household 
are constant over time. The reduced forms of the household borrowing and household 
welfare equations using panel data are as follows: 
c
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where x1ijt = x1ijt-x1ijt-1; x2ijt = x2ijt-x2ijt-1; x3ijt = x3ijt-x3ijt-1; cijt = citk-cijt-1 ; the parameters 
of interest are ci (i=0,1,2,3) and i (i=0,1,2,c). 
Although the panel data may reduce the possibility of endogeneity of credit 
resulting from the unobservable characteristics of household and of the local market, it 
does not control for the non-random allocation of credit. It is still possible that credit is 
available and allocated more to households in poorer villages in both time t and t+1. We 
may think of the fact that such strategies as poverty reduction and regional development 
target the same markets in both times, t and t+1. The non-random allocation of credit 
causes the possibility of endogeneity of credit as it does with cross-section data. 
Moreover, we have assumed that unobservable characteristics of households and local 
markets are time invariant, but it may not always be the case. Therefore, the estimation of 
(4) using panel data is possibly biased, and results in inconsistent coefficients (for similar 
comments, see Khandker, 2003). 
The econometric solution to this problem is to use instrumental variables in a 
two-stage regression method. The idea of using instruments is that we find variables that 
are well-correlated with household borrowing cijt, but are not correlated with household 
welfare yijt. In the first stage regression, the instruments are used to estimate the values of 
household borrowing that are not affected by household characteristics. In the second 
stage, the estimated values are used instead of household borrowing to correct for the 
endogeneity of credit. The equivalent is to use the estimated residuals together with 
household borrowing in the second stage. The significance of the estimated residuals 
indicates whether or not the instruments and the two-stage regression are appropriate. We 
construct and apply the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) for this purpose. 
Selecting instrumental variables is not a trivial task. Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
use the exogenous loan eligibility criteria that a lender employs to select a borrower as 
the instrument. Such exogenous properties are appropriate for credit program assessment 
where they have specific selection criteria for the participants. Khandker (2003) uses the 
characteristics of the competitors as the instruments. His idea is that given a limited 
supply of funds, what matters is the allocation of funds by the lenders. The amount of 
credit that a household borrows depends not only on its own characteristics, but also on 
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the characteristics of the competitors. The competitors may be at village level as well as 
district level where they influence the amount of credit that a particular household 
receives, but not the household welfare. 
We follow Khandker’s idea in the sense that the availability of funds is an 
important factor that affects the amount of credit that one household may receive, but not 
the household welfare. However, we consider the availability of funds and the 
competition between the informal and formal lenders in the village and commune to 
which the households have access, rather than in the village and commune of the 
competitors. The idea is that the amount of credit that one household can borrow is 
dependent on the amount of credit available in the village and commune. Moreover, if the 
households have access to both formal and informal sources of funds, the amount of 
household borrowing may be affected by the choice of where to borrow from since the 
households apparently choose between the two lenders. Alternatively, the amount of 
credit that a lender allocates a borrower may depend on the availability of credit from its 
competitor. 
 
Sample selection bias 
 
In order to gauge the impact of consecutive borrowing on household welfare, we are 
interested in the sample of households who borrow at time t. At time t+1, there are two 
sub-samples: (i) households who borrow at both times, t and t+1; and (ii) households 
who borrow at t but not at t+1. For convenience, if a household borrows at both times t 
and t+1, it is called “participant household”; otherwise, it is called “non-participant 
household”.   
If we take the sample of participant households only and estimate the credit 
impact using the two-stage regression procedure, the results may suffer from sample 
selection bias. The reason is that the households who are non-participant households are 
possibly excluded for some reasons such as their self-selection or the exclusion by the 
lender, especially if the lender learns about a borrower’s credit worthiness during the first 
period. If so, the results are inconsistent or at least less interesting since we do not know 
what would happen to the welfare of the non-participant households if they had chosen to 
borrow. The micro econometric analysis below will show how the selection bias matters 
and how we control for it. For convenience, we denote: 
yi = yijt;  
x1i = (x1ijt, x1ijt);  
x2i = (x1ijt, x2ijt,  x2ijt);  
s*i = cijt if a participant household; and s*i = g (constant, g < cijt) otherwise.  
The equations (3) and (4) now become the following: 
iii xy 111           (5) 
iii xs 222
*           (6) 
Equation (5) represents the household welfare and equation (6) indicates the 
exclusion propensity. Thus, yi is the observed welfare for household i if it is a participant 
household and s*i is a latent variable that indicates the propensity to be a participant 
household. Vectors x1i and x2i are vectors of observed explanatory variables; 1i and 2i 
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are mean-zero stochastic errors representing the influence of unobserved variables 
affecting yi and s*i . The parameters of interest are β1 and β2. 
Since the latent variable s*i is unobserved, we define a dummy variable: 
si = 1 if s*i > g     
si = 0 if otherwise.  
We thus observe the welfare of participant households only if si = 1, i.e., if the 
households borrow at both times, t and t+1. It is likely that the unobserved terms 1i and 
2i are correlated: households with lower welfare, the poorer, given x1i and x2i, are more 
likely to want to be participant households. If so, the sample of participant households 
observed will not accurately represent the underlying population. Hence, inappropriate 
selection of samples for study generally produces inconsistent estimates of the parameters 
in the welfare equation. 
To solve the sample selection problem, we follow the Heckman (1979) approach, 
which suggested a simple method to deal with this selection problem. The conditional 
mean of 1i can be written as follows1: 
)()0( 2221
*
1  iiiii xEsE        (7) 
and hence 
)()1,( 22211111  iiiiiii xExsxyE      (8) 
Equation (8) shows that the regression equation on the selected sample depends 
on both x1i and x2i. Omitting the conditional mean of 1i biases the estimates of β1 unless 
1i and 2i are uncorrelated. Selection bias can thus be regarded as a standard problem of 
omitted-variable bias. The solution is to find an empirical representation of the 
conditional mean of 1i and includes this variable in the welfare equation.  
Under the assumption that 1i and 2i are drawn from a bivariate normal 
distribution, we can derive the regression equation: 
iiiii xsxyE  11111 )1,(        (9) 
where  is the correlation coefficient between 1i and 2i, 1 is the standard deviation of 
1i, and i is the inverse of Mill’s ratio (see Greene, 2003), which is given by: 
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where  and  are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal 
distribution and 2 is the standard deviation of 2i. 
The Heckman approach suggests estimation of (8) in a two-step procedure. The 
first step involves estimating the parameters in (6) by the Probit method, using the entire 
sample. These estimates can then be used to compute i for each household in the sample. 
Once i is computed, we can estimate (5) over the sample of participant households by 
ordinary least squares regression, treating 1 as the regression coefficient for i. 
 
The integrated model 
 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we include an intercept in x2 and hence we can normalize g to 0. 
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Having paid attention to both the problem of endogenous credit and sample selection bias, 
the integrated model can be estimated as follows. The first step involves estimating the 
parameters in (6) by the Probit method, using the entire sample. The inverse Mill’s ratio 
i is then calculated for each household. The second step involves estimating the 
parameters in (3) by the least squares method, using a sample of participant households. 
The predicted value of credit and the predicted residual are then calculated for each 
household. The last step involves estimating the parameters in (4) by the least squares 
method, using the participant households and the predicted value of credit instead of the 
true value. The predicted residual and the inverse Mill’s ratio are included as the 
explanatory variables to control for endogenous credit and sample selection bias.  
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
Our data is drawn from two surveys on living standards in Vietnam in 1993 (Survey 1) 
and 1998 (Survey 2). These two surveys were the first of their type in Vietnam and 
conducted with technical assistance from international organizations. We choose these 
two surveys because we believe they are more reliable than the later surveys for the 
purpose of this paper as they provide a wider coverage across the rural areas in the 
country. This reduces greatly the possibility of sample selection bias to some extent. 
Survey 1 covers a sample of 4,799 households, 150 communes and 300 villages 
over the country. There are 3,839 rural households, accounting for 80% of the overall 
sample. Of the rural households, there are 1,985 households (41.4%) holding debt from 
various sources. Survey 2 was designed to provide an up-to-date source of data on 
households. It covers a sample of 5,999 households, 194 communes and 388 villages, 
including all households surveyed in Survey 1. The proportion of rural households is 
71.2% (4,269 households). 38.9% of rural households borrow from one source or 
another. The timing of the second survey approximately five years after the first 
facilitates the analysis of medium term trends in living standards. 
The construction of variables is an important and complicated part of our 
methodology. As we have mentioned in the model section, we consider the change or 
time difference between values in Survey 2 and Survey 1. As a result, any variable should 
be understood as the difference estimator.  
Following this construction, the groups of variables are considered as follows. 
The dependent variables, which proxy for household welfare, include per capita 
expenditure, per capita food expenditure, per capita non-food expenditure and household 
poverty status in logarithm form. These variables are considered in the form of difference 
estimators. The household poverty status is a dummy variable where if the household 
improves its poverty classification, which is given by the survey, between the two 
surveys, the dependent variable takes the value of 1, and otherwise 0. The explanatory 
variables of interest including formal borrowing, informal borrowing and total household 
borrowing, are constructed by the sum of all loans from the formal, informal and both 
sources respectively. The differenced variables are then computed by calculating the 
difference in borrowing (in logarithm form) between Survey 2 and Survey 1.  
The household characteristics include variables of natural attributes such as age, 
gender of household head, farm household; and variables of household assets such as 
savings and farm-land owning in differenced variable form. For the differenced variable 
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of the age of the household head, we look at the age groups (i.e. the first digit of the 
actual age) and therefore we avoid the problem of the same differenced variables of age 
for every household head. The differenced variables of gender of the household head and 
the type of business are constructed as dummy variables. The dummy variable of gender 
takes the value of 1 if the household head is male in Survey 2 but female in Survey 1 (i.e. 
the household head died between two surveys), and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable of 
farm household takes the value of 1 if the household is a farm household in Survey 2, but 
non-farm household in Survey 1 i.e. new farm household, and 0 otherwise. 
The local market characteristic variables include: the prices of selected goods 
and services; the averaged household characteristics in a commune, such as averaged 
education, and averaged farm-land owning. All are in the form of differenced variables 
which are calculated by taking the difference between values (in logarithm form) in 
Survey 2 and Survey 1. The construction of variables of local market characteristics is 
mainly for the purpose of control for the location fixed effects, rather than for 
comparison. The lender characteristics include proxy variables, in differenced variable 
form, of the availability of funds at commune and village levels and the competition 
between lenders. We consider the availability of both formal and informal funds to 
control for the competition between these two sources of funds within the same location. 
The descriptive variables are presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE AND RESULTS 
 
In this section, we implement the three stage regression analysis. The first stage estimates 
the probability of a household being a participant household i.e. borrowing again in the 
second period. The second stage is to control for the endogenous credit by estimating the 
factors that affect the change in the amount of borrowing for the participant households. 
In the third stage, the inverse Mill’s ratios and the predicted residuals, which result from 
the first stage and the second stage, are included as explanatory variables to control for 
the sample selection bias and the endogeneity of credit in the estimation of household 
welfare. The regression procedure is implemented for three samples formal, informal and 
total borrowing. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 presents the results from first stage regression. Of the household 
characteristics, a household tends not to borrow in the second period when the household 
head becomes older; they shift their business to farm activities; or they have savings. 
More interestingly, the results indicate that there is a competition between formal and 
informal lenders and that in order to help rural households gain access to formal credit, 
the credit network must be extended at village level. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows the second stage. Among other results, we see that more 
education may result in reducing the demand for household borrowing and that more 
educated households are reluctant to borrow from informal lenders. Interestingly, we find 
no evidence for the use of farmland ownership as a screening criteria for loans. And 
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again, we find the availability of funds at village level is an important influence on 
household borrowing. 
 
[Insert Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 about here] 
 Table 4 shows the existence of the sample selection bias and the endogeneity of 
credit. We only include the predicted residuals and inverse Mill’s ratios in the third stage 
regressions if they are found significant. Tables from 5 to 8 report the third stage 
regressions and all suggest that the change in the amount of household borrowing is 
positively and significantly related to the change in household welfare as measured by 
per capita expenditure, per capita food expenditure, per capita non-food expenditure and 
household poverty status, at a sufficiently small level of significance. The results also 
indicate that both formal and informal credit have positive and significant effects on 
household welfares. Furthermore, our results suggest that formal credit has a slightly 
higher impact than informal credit. Although the proxies for household welfares are 
different, our conclusions are similar to those of Lensink and Pham (2012), Doan et al 
(2014), and Tran et al (2015). One may interpret this finding to mean that the growth in 
household borrowing relates to the growth in household welfare, and thus reflects the 
long-run impact of credit on household welfare. However, the coefficients of the 
relationship are found to be small. This raises the issue of cost-benefit analysis.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have presented an econometric framework for estimating the long-term 
impact of credit on households, using panel data from household surveys. Our 
econometric procedure takes into account the problems of sample selection bias and 
endogenous credit (Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Coleman, 1999). We employ a three stage 
regression: the first stage controls for the sample selection bias; the second stage controls 
for the endogeneity of credit; and the third stage is to estimate the credit impact on 
household welfare, where the inverse Mill’s ratios and the predicted residuals, which are 
computed from the first and second stages, are included as explanatory variables. 
We find that credit has a long-term positive and significant impact on household 
welfare at the 1% level of significance. Our findings confirm the conclusions widely cited 
in the literature (Khandker, 1998, 2001, 2003; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Coleman, 2002; 
Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Augsburg et al, 2014; Angelucci et al, 2015; Banerjee et al, 
2015) and in Vietnam (Lensink and Pham, 2012; Doan et al, 2014; and Tran et al, 2015). 
The findings also indicate that both formal and informal credit contributes to household 
welfares and that formal credit has a relatively higher impact than informal credit. This 
conclusion is a bit different with Doan et al (2014), which does not suggest the role of 
informal credit. This finding indicates that providing credit to the poor has a positive 
impact on household poverty reduction. We also conclude that there is competition 
between formal and informal credit in rural areas at village level and in order to help rural 
households gain more access to credit, the credit network must be extended to the village 
level.   
However, we should be concerned about the low impact of credit on household 
welfare. Given the high costs of providing credit to rural households, the benefit (i.e. the 
impact) may be lower than the cost, and hence the question is raised: should we provide 
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credit on a risk-related or a subsidized basis?. Moreover, credit is not the only tool in a 
poverty reduction strategy, so why do we need to supply cheap credit? We however leave 
these questions for future research. 
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TABLE 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES USED IN THIS STUDY 
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
Change in total household borrowing (Log of S2/S1+, VND1000) 1.258727 1.337696 5.298317 -6.21461 1.311738 970 
Change in formal borrowing (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 1.659879 0.77174 10.4631 -9.6486 4.470119 970 
Change in informal borrowing (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) -0.18709 0 10.45109 -10.0858 4.351428 970 
Increase in per capita expenditure (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 0.684143 0.677341 2.22729 -1.0513 0.440623 970 
Change in per capita food expenditure (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 0.607207 0.60202 2.664455 -1.35539 0.433719 970 
Change in per capita non-food expenditure (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 0.826015 0.829054 3.115618 -2.11796 0.671965 970 
Dummy: if poverty status changes 0.310309 0 1 0 0.462859 970 
Change in age group of household head 0.298969 0 5 -5 1.012461 970 
Change in education of household head (years) 0.564948 0 16 -11 2.330842 970 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.048454 0 1 0 0.214834 970 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.021649 0 1 0 0.145611 970 
Change in household size (persons) -0.17835 0 5 -11 1.613969 970 
Change in ownership of farming land (Log of S2/S1, hectare) -0.95095 -0.72157 9.10498 -11.0021 2.670397 970 
Change in financial savings (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 3.260722 4.068698 9.615805 -7.6009 3.192478 970 
Change in non-financial savings (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 1.066843 0 11.0021 -10.309 4.025281 970 
Change in price of detergent (Log of S2/S1, VND1000/kg) -0.09198 -0.05711 2.169054 -0.87467 0.447066 970 
Change in price of fish sauce (Log of S2/S1, VND1000/bottle) 0.633214 0.559616 2.197225 -0.80968 0.572161 970 
Change in price of noodles (Log of S2/S1, VND1000/pack) 0.314333 0.287682 0.972861 -0.18232 0.193624 970 
Change in price of pork (Log of S2/S1, VND1000/kg) 0.444679 0.446287 0.899758 0.162519 0.142338 970 
Change in price of ordinary rice (Log of S2/S1, VND1000/kg) 0.66744 0.67634 1.052818 0.153492 0.170443 970 
Change in price of sewing service (Log of S2/S1, VND1000/trouser) 0.777575 0.693147 1.734601 0 0.413172 970 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.039763 0.04 1.83 -2.72 0.781263 970 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (Log of S2/S1, 
hectare) -0.83698 -0.9065 7.8 -2.578 1.00587 970 
Change in number of households in commune (households) -978.647 -823 247 -4154 665.7434 970 
Change in price index of the region 0.012842 0.025835 0.099597 -0.08317 0.036564 970 
Change in the availability of informal fund in village (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 0.545066 0.793092 8.941153 -10.3156 2.297871 970 
Change in the availability of formal fund in village (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 1.813926 1.711221 11.12726 -9.16952 3.239065 970 
Change in availability of formal funds in commune (Log of S2/S1, VND1000) 1.4932 1.691676 9.87817 -8.90463 2.484622 970 
Note: Log of S2/S1 = value in Survey 2 divided by value in Survey 1 in logarithm form = value in Survey 2 in logarithm form – value in Survey 1 in logarithm 
form. 
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TABLE 2 – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 
 
   Formal   Informal   Total 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.   
Change in age group of household head -0.059868 -1.008687 0.3131 0.028096 0.629145 0.5293 -0.082077 -2.138169 0.0325 
Change in education of household head (years) -0.005059 -0.195974 0.8446 0.017723 0.950480 0.3419 -0.001082 -0.067941 0.9458 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.494563 -2.141800 0.0322 -0.059175 -0.343427 0.7313 -0.279612 -1.944081 0.0519 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.084813 0.178163 0.8586 -0.288231 -0.924640 0.3552 0.031765 0.119464 0.9049 
Change in household size (persons) -0.022265 -0.663302 0.5071 -0.014225 -0.522717 0.6012 0.016060 0.742333 0.4579 
Change in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.029302 1.212080 0.2255 0.028425 1.622342 0.1047 0.007632 0.531862 0.5948 
Change in financial savings (VND1000) -0.004807 -0.279889 0.7796 -0.050172 -3.808391 0.0001 -0.028600 -2.532805 0.0113 
Change in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.019953 -1.424060 0.1544 -0.041818 -4.009752 0.0001 -0.031903 -3.697330 0.0002 
Change in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.309413 2.425440 0.0153 0.003282 0.030713 0.9755 0.067955 0.845790 0.3977 
Change in price of fish sauce (VND1000/bottle) 0.091820 0.891640 0.3726 -0.051934 -0.647640 0.5172 -0.126614 -1.880585 0.0600 
Change in price of noodles (VND1000/pack) 0.196005 0.630200 0.5286 -0.248230 -1.067958 0.2855 0.208178 1.105832 0.2688 
Change in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.509921 1.180660 0.2377 0.613708 1.990966 0.0465 0.221996 0.862429 0.3885 
Change in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.534641 -1.464423 0.1431 0.096637 0.359823 0.7190 -0.489018 -2.202483 0.0276 
Change in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.102569 0.696204 0.4863 -0.176573 -1.589655 0.1119 0.007040 0.076510 0.9390 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.014639 0.172747 0.8629 0.045636 0.772939 0.4396 -0.001858 -0.038137 0.9696 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.176221 -2.462660 0.0138 -0.060181 -1.496800 0.1344 -0.051199 -1.537817 0.1241 
Change in number of households in commune (households) -0.000181 -2.019783 0.0434 -8.45E-05 -1.420133 0.1556 -2.55E-05 -0.493214 0.6219 
Change in price index of the region -3.749966 -2.197629 0.0280 -1.025642 -0.849724 0.3955 -2.407694 -2.354277 0.0186 
Change in the availability of informal fund in village (VND1000) -0.070353 -2.645274 0.0082 0.257996 7.185731 0.0000 0.039638 2.487012 0.0129 
Change in the availability of formal fund in village (VND1000) 0.239574 3.426609 0.0006 -0.056190 -3.235639 0.0012 0.012355 0.796476 0.4258 
Change in availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000) 0.027843 0.356043 0.7218 0.023479 1.016204 0.3095 0.012360 0.598450 0.5495 
C  -0.487218 -1.171094 0.2416 -0.262169 -0.910678 0.3625 0.735368 3.039490 0.0024 
Mean dependent var 0.473035   0.412234   0.639842   
McFadden R-squared 0.123162   0.105810   0.034713   
Log likelihood -393.6199   -683.5210   -956.3288   
LR statistic (21 df) 110.5768   161.7620   68.78238   
Probability(LR stat) 3.71E-14   0.000000   5.50E-07   
Total obs 649   1128   1516   
Obs with Dep=1 307   465   970   
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TABLE 3 – SECOND STAGE REGRESSION 
 
   Formal   Informal   Total 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
Change in age group of household head -0.003035 -0.049809 0.9603 -0.039864 -0.571683 0.5678 -0.035905 -0.804680 0.4212 
Change in education of household head (years) -0.016087 -0.565388 0.5723 -0.073221 -2.431726 0.0154 -0.044742 -2.282449 0.0227 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.512816 -1.798786 0.0731 -0.188381 -0.664380 0.5068 -0.353820 -1.817413 0.0695 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.308976 0.715587 0.4748 -0.464803 -0.913929 0.3613 0.170418 0.567480 0.5705 
Change in household size (persons) 0.056545 1.722983 0.0860 0.063182 1.444721 0.1492 0.052008 2.005694 0.0452 
Change in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.018009 -0.714277 0.4756 0.001922 0.067899 0.9459 -0.007746 -0.453572 0.6502 
Change in financial savings (VND1000) 0.040916 2.333062 0.0203 0.019008 0.930748 0.3525 0.046507 3.461918 0.0006 
Change in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.026722 1.890427 0.0597 -0.004519 -0.257716 0.7967 -0.002149 -0.201687 0.8402 
Change in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.018127 0.140050 0.8887 -0.016744 -0.093608 0.9255 0.146300 1.451724 0.1469 
Change in price of fish sauce (VND1000/bottle) 0.054931 0.562486 0.5742 0.221881 1.682538 0.0932 0.054203 0.682861 0.4949 
Change in price of noodles (VND1000/pack) -0.339858 -1.055215 0.2922 0.186735 0.469616 0.6389 0.360164 1.546406 0.1223 
Change in price of pork (VND1000/kg) -0.876607 -2.040432 0.0422 -0.271778 -0.539364 0.5899 0.034437 0.111440 0.9113 
Change in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.201898 0.513618 0.6079 -0.273154 -0.617563 0.5372 -0.294298 -1.087352 0.2772 
Change in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.029579 0.181961 0.8557 0.089821 0.503526 0.6148 -0.041748 -0.364011 0.7159 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.024614 0.283242 0.7772 0.003105 0.032704 0.9739 -0.056421 -0.948658 0.3430 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.118392 -1.328967 0.1849 -0.070533 -0.997951 0.3188 -0.029904 -0.655411 0.5124 
Change in number of households in commune (households) 3.48E-05 0.333381 0.7391 -1.45E-05 -0.152706 0.8787 0.000127 1.877255 0.0608 
Change in price index of the region 2.603701 1.494464 0.1362 1.017354 0.516302 0.6059 -0.221518 -0.175279 0.8609 
Change in the availability of informal fund in village (VND1000) 0.049235 1.997019 0.0468 0.273414 3.903332 0.0001 0.061332 2.975752 0.0030 
Change in the availability of formal fund in village (VND1000) 0.470267 5.407295 0.0000 0.040033 1.342999 0.1800 0.073036 3.512636 0.0005 
Change in availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000) 0.070458 0.678270 0.4982 -0.021515 -0.574503 0.5659 -0.026758 -0.984729 0.3250 
C 0.587433 1.256574 0.2099 0.803939 1.714549 0.0871 1.218917 4.189421 0.0000 
R-squared 0.337218   0.083656   0.066044   
Adjusted R-squared 0.288381   0.040217   0.045355   
F-statistic 6.905032   1.925845   3.192237   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   0.008496   0.000002   
Log likelihood -400.0566   -785.9999   -1605.945   
Durbin-Watson stat 2.885498   2.049768   2.071620   
Number of observations 307   465   970   
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TABLE 4 - TESTS OF SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS AND ENDOGENEITY OF CREDIT 
 
 Formal  Informal  Total  
 t-statistics Prob. t-statistics Prob. t-statistics Prob. 
Per capita expenditure       
Predicted residuals -0.168346 0.8664 -1.207697 0.2278 -3.250263 0.0012* 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 2.184167 0.0298* 1.577784 0.1153 1.936737 0.0531** 
Per capita food expenditure       
Predicted residuals 0.388623 0.6978 -1.073712 0.2835 -2.227034 0.0262* 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 1.506197 0.1331 1.500872 0.1341 0.098025 0.9219 
Per capita non-food expenditure       
Predicted residuals -0.898350 0.3698 -1.199850 0.2308 -2.848845 0.0045* 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 2.367454 0.0186* 1.030706 0.3032 2.290689 0.0222* 
Change in household poverty status       
Predicted residuals -0.270719 0.7866 -0.797482 0.4252 -1.638231 0.1014 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 1.342636 0.1794 1.044812 0.2961 0.782798 0.4337 
* Significant at 5% 
** Significant at 10% 
Note: Significant at 10% indicating that the control of endogenous credit and sample selection bias is necessary. 
The test of predicted residuals indicates Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
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TABLE 5 – THIRD STAGE REGRESSION: PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE  
 
   Formal   Informal   Total 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
Change in age group of household head -0.002194 -0.093832 0.9253 0.023776 1.238121 0.2163 0.013132 0.773420 0.4395 
Change in education of household head (years) 0.009087 0.853351 0.3942 0.002979 0.356495 0.7216 0.013310 1.995201 0.0463 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.194841 -1.674559 0.0951 -0.073383 -0.931849 0.3519 -0.048351 -0.734803 0.4626 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.004031 -0.024468 0.9805 0.114249 0.811386 0.4176 -0.010031 -0.111742 0.9111 
Change in household size (persons) -0.094226 -7.416255 0.0000 -0.091289 -7.583252 0.0000 -0.096559 -11.59023 0.0000 
Change in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.029143 3.029618 0.0027 -0.002068 -0.264629 0.7914 0.002394 0.449165 0.6534 
Change in financial savings (VND1000) 0.015196 2.236452 0.0261 0.013070 2.324764 0.0205 -0.004234 -0.520448 0.6029 
Change in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.004317 0.776476 0.4381 0.004246 0.889887 0.3740 0.002929 0.523526 0.6007 
Change in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.187426 4.116301 0.0001 0.135627 2.817174 0.0051 0.097721 3.186287 0.0015 
Change in price of fish sauce (VND1000/bottle) 0.131589 3.617327 0.0004 0.020817 0.571990 0.5676 0.011340 0.354925 0.7227 
Change in price of noodles (VND1000/pack) -0.091825 -0.749148 0.4544 0.286004 2.706666 0.0071 0.034844 0.466191 0.6412 
Change in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.193292 1.203187 0.2299 0.027116 0.197326 0.8437 0.152356 1.526267 0.1273 
Change in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.129909 -0.801953 0.4232 -0.197759 -1.628366 0.1041 -0.008588 -0.091258 0.9273 
Change in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.143664 2.592270 0.0100 0.247381 5.261577 0.0000 0.184266 5.760036 0.0000 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.012954 -0.399927 0.6895 0.012695 0.498322 0.6185 0.039722 2.227464 0.0262 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.051236 -1.380018 0.1687 0.000801 0.041481 0.9669 0.007608 0.497559 0.6189 
Change in price index of the region -3.733759 -5.631919 0.0000 -1.477565 -2.888825 0.0041 -3.029959 -5.705976 0.0000 
Change in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.059048 2.784477 0.0057 0.030094 2.328712 0.0203 0.276427 3.587656 0.0004 
Predicted residuals       -0.252881 -3.250263 0.0012 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.356939 2.979498 0.0031    0.539742 1.936737 0.0531 
C 0.086026 0.516834 0.6057 0.465894 3.738031 0.0002 -0.151590 -0.770013 0.4415 
R-squared 0.352073   0.246586   0.265618   
Adjusted R-squared 0.309179   0.216449   0.250142   
F-statistic 8.207945   8.182273   17.16219   
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   
Log likelihood -105.9159   -194.5800   -431.1583   
Durbin-Watson stat 3.002922   1.572069   1.957169   
Number of observations 307   465   970   
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TABLE 6 – THIRD STAGE REGRESSION: PER CAPITA FOOD EXPENDITURE 
 
   Formal   Informal   Total 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
Change in age group of household head -0.019049 -0.761673 0.4469 0.029227 1.471342 0.1419 0.031899 2.335731 0.0197 
Change in education of household head (years) 0.001762 0.153329 0.8782 0.000953 0.110196 0.9123 0.008825 1.353187 0.1763 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.151058 -1.278458 0.2021 -0.088218 -1.082974 0.2794 0.011242 0.179030 0.8580 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.164563 0.926309 0.3551 0.329935 2.265238 0.0240 0.130252 1.409615 0.1590 
Change in household size (persons) -0.069405 -5.102924 0.0000 -0.088171 -7.080663 0.0000 -0.091134 -10.62772 0.0000 
Change in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.030566 2.976578 0.0032 0.008980 1.111124 0.2671 0.006230 1.190826 0.2340 
Change in financial savings (VND1000) 0.010127 1.388253 0.1661 0.016121 2.772162 0.0058 0.007619 1.577831 0.1149 
Change in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.009103 1.591017 0.1127 0.001246 0.252560 0.8007 0.008956 2.729738 0.0065 
Change in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.204633 4.214801 0.0000 0.161370 3.240425 0.0013 0.093898 2.992032 0.0028 
Change in price of fish sauce (VND1000/bottle) 0.038769 0.991033 0.3225 0.024201 0.642864 0.5206 0.016869 0.682342 0.4952 
Change in price of noodles (VND1000/pack) -0.029713 -0.224753 0.8223 0.237050 2.168781 0.0306 -0.017340 -0.227333 0.8202 
Change in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.153567 0.906281 0.3655 0.085271 0.599899 0.5489 -0.013164 -0.140549 0.8883 
Change in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.160895 1.022754 0.3073 -0.028984 -0.230720 0.8176 0.119913 1.447343 0.1481 
Change in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.087576 1.486423 0.1383 0.130737 2.688191 0.0075 0.083558 2.547847 0.0110 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.002544 -0.073531 0.9414 -0.007085 -0.268868 0.7882 0.010043 0.554936 0.5791 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.029329 0.797790 0.4256 0.001489 0.074573 0.9406 0.022923 1.639442 0.1015 
Change in price index of the region -3.003928 -4.448526 0.0000 -1.013409 -1.915454 0.0561 -1.731223 -4.521817 0.0000 
Change in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.036497 1.764616 0.0787 0.027307 2.042776 0.0417 0.180393 3.141537 0.0017 
Predicted residuals       -0.173109 -2.970382 0.0030 
Inverse Mill’s ratios          
C 0.286281 1.738596 0.0832 0.354579 2.750306 0.0062 0.222798 2.223768 0.0264 
R-squared 0.243031   0.209969   0.195603   
Adjusted R-squared 0.195721   0.178368   0.179516   
F-statistic 5.136943   6.644336   12.15840   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   
Log likelihood -129.9228   -210.4417   -460.0054   
Durbin-Watson stat 2.622498   1.376334   1.832193   
Number of observations 307   465   970   
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TABLE 7 – THIRD STAGE REGRESSION: PER CAPITA NON-FOOD EXPENDITURE 
 
   Formal   Informal   Total 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
Change in age group of household head 0.025572 0.690383 0.4905 0.015677 0.504073 0.6145 -0.009119 -0.335741 0.7371 
Change in education of household head (years) 0.012511 0.741687 0.4589 0.005527 0.408397 0.6832 0.019570 1.833870 0.0670 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.106984 -0.580427 0.5621 -0.087468 -0.685835 0.4932 -0.123646 -1.174648 0.2404 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.252471 -0.967506 0.3341 -0.115602 -0.506941 0.6124 -0.182082 -1.267947 0.2051 
Change in household size (persons) -0.108829 -5.407132 0.0000 -0.070294 -3.605602 0.0003 -0.091656 -6.877365 0.0000 
Change in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.027619 1.812472 0.0710 -0.011921 -0.942199 0.3466 0.001317 0.154432 0.8773 
Change in financial savings (VND1000) 0.025631 2.381154 0.0179 0.013811 1.516886 0.1300 -0.012961 -0.995903 0.3196 
Change in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.002450 0.278177 0.7811 0.004837 0.625970 0.5317 -0.001580 -0.176544 0.8599 
Change in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.107384 1.488764 0.1376 0.126201 1.618645 0.1062 0.100941 2.057435 0.0399 
Change in price of fish sauce (VND1000/bottle) 0.239199 4.150836 0.0000 0.031807 0.539648 0.5897 0.025245 0.493936 0.6215 
Change in price of noodles (VND1000/pack) -0.204641 -1.053922 0.2928 0.341059 1.993028 0.0469 0.090590 0.757665 0.4488 
Change in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.291365 1.144894 0.2532 -0.092421 -0.415294 0.6781 0.389087 2.436580 0.0150 
Change in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.139708 -0.544428 0.5866 -0.407558 -2.072170 0.0388 -0.068136 -0.452584 0.6510 
Change in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.286645 3.265014 0.0012 0.413022 5.424305 0.0000 0.334511 6.536592 0.0000 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.002939 -0.057276 0.9544 0.049190 1.192276 0.2338 0.099338 3.482210 0.0005 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.087693 -1.491003 0.1371 -0.010113 -0.323390 0.7466 -0.008087 -0.330596 0.7410 
Change in price index of the region -3.853640 -3.669361 0.0003 -2.591815 -3.128959 0.0019 -4.666223 -5.493135 0.0000 
Change in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.076553 2.278827 0.0234 0.025253 1.206615 0.2282 0.392661 3.185734 0.0015 
Predicted residuals       -0.354573 -2.848845 0.0045 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.470884 2.481260 0.0137    1.021222 2.290689 0.0222 
C -0.131479 -0.498637 0.6184 0.659340 3.266529 0.0012 -0.586386 -1.861970 0.0629 
R-squared 0.272830   0.147988   0.191949   
Adjusted R-squared 0.224690   0.113908   0.174920   
F-statistic 5.667407   4.342312   11.27154   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   
Log likelihood -247.1467   -420.6909   -886.8798   
Durbin-Watson stat 2.587833   1.583649   1.895583   
Number of observations 307   469   970   
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TABLE 8 – THIRD STAGE REGRESSION: POVERTY STATUS  
 
   Formal   Informal   Total 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.   
Change in age group of household head 0.020088 0.196686 0.8441 0.080134 1.036549 0.2999 0.057815 1.130271 0.2584 
Change in education of household head (years) 0.036227 0.819272 0.4126 0.047158 1.453238 0.1462 0.028134 1.283794 0.1992 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.163529 -0.380882 0.7033 0.025004 0.078972 0.9371 0.013247 0.062451 0.9502 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.356326 -0.563029 0.5734 0.855443 1.682285 0.0925 0.033397 0.104049 0.9171 
Change in household size (persons) -0.239667 -4.128844 0.0000 -0.269116 -5.741169 0.0000 -0.233516 -7.788203 0.0000 
Change in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.021724 0.538997 0.5899 -0.013026 -0.426417 0.6698 -0.010628 -0.554833 0.5790 
Change in financial savings (VND1000) 0.069566 2.454949 0.0141 0.017493 0.827461 0.4080 0.043800 2.941996 0.0033 
Change in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.014679 0.664048 0.5067 0.032430 1.821756 0.0685 0.030323 2.662839 0.0077 
Change in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.320613 1.808638 0.0705 0.553294 2.928744 0.0034 0.405510 3.903818 0.0001 
Change in price of fish sauce (VND1000/bottle) 0.444634 2.721664 0.0065 0.056397 0.407342 0.6838 0.145633 1.660740 0.0968 
Change in price of noodles (VND1000/pack) -1.000601 -1.947601 0.0515 0.311936 0.781779 0.4343 -0.155319 -0.615913 0.5380 
Change in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.098113 0.143574 0.8858 0.010401 0.019030 0.9848 0.221028 0.648323 0.5168 
Change in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.355575 0.582809 0.5600 -0.532984 -1.158793 0.2465 -0.143502 -0.487852 0.6257 
Change in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.870076 3.840721 0.0001 0.683149 3.722959 0.0002 0.571055 4.901279 0.0000 
Change in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.066533 0.477952 0.6327 -0.029656 -0.309163 0.7572 0.033749 0.519851 0.6032 
Change in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.093490 0.617611 0.5368 0.070000 0.975033 0.3295 0.080334 1.682880 0.0924 
Change in price index of the region -8.003293 -3.105624 0.0019 -7.691592 -3.909176 0.0001 -7.389553 -5.719216 0.0000 
Change in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.124171 1.542411 0.1230 0.111770 2.216517 0.0267 0.098881 2.843432 0.0045 
Predicted residuals          
Inverse Mill’s ratios          
C -1.888524 -2.839825 0.0045 -1.014009 -2.124622 0.0336 -1.249388 -4.179761 0.0000 
Mean dependent var 0.286645   0.302772   0.311475   
McFadden R-squared 0.196917   0.167269   0.153379   
Log likelihood -147.7110   -239.4836   -512.5357   
LR statistic (18 df) 72.43778   96.20933   185.7076   
Probability(LR stat) 1.74E-08   1.09E-12   0.000000   
Total obs 307   469   976   
Obs with Dep=1 88   142   304   
 
 
 
